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NOTES, COMMENTS AND DIGESTS
NOTES
AIRCRAFT-DEATH
MON

BY

WRONGFUL

ACT-NEGLIGENCE-CoM-

CARRIERS-RES IPSA LoQUITUR.-E. M. Allison as Adminis-

strator of Estate of Thomas J. Kelly, Deceased v. Standard Air
Lines threatens to become a landmark case in the history of American Air Law. This action prosecuted in the United States District
Court, Southern District of California, Central Division (where it
is known as No. 3516 H.) was tried before the Honorable George
Cosgrave, District Judge, sitting with a jury, September 17 to 19,
1930. Verdict for the defendant. Motion for new trial is now
pending. Final disposition may be expected in the Supreme Court
of the United States.
On March 30, 1929, the deceased Thomas J. Kelly, purchased
a ticket from the defendant airline for passenger transportation
from Los Angeles, California, to El Paso, Texas. Defendant was
then, and had been for a considerable period of time immediately
antecedent thereto, the operator of an airline between Los Angeles
and El Paso. Passengers had been regularly received and transported, as well as had express. Deceased boarded defendant's
plane in Los Angeles and flew as a passenger to a point near Banning, California, where the plane crashed-presumably in an attempt to land-and all on board were killed.
Action was filed in the Federal Court based on diversity of
citizenship. The complaint charged negligence on the part of the
defendant resulting in Kelly's death. Demand was made for fifty
thousand dollars damages.
Defendant denied negligence and set up as a separate and distinct defense a set of facts including-the known favorable condition of the weather at the originating terminal of the line, the belief that the pilot had a "clear and unobstructed vision for the whole
distance of the [San Gorgonio] Pass" (in which the crash occurred)
at the time the plane entered said pass, that the pilot became enveloped in clouds while in the pass due to an unforeseen and unforeseeable action of the elements and lost his course and that the
accident was due to unforeseen events and act of God. The last
specification is clearly conjectural, no person having survived the
accident and no witness being produced at the trial to give direct
evidence thereof.
A third, separate and distinct defense is pleaded in the form
of the contract for transportation by which it is alleged that deceased
covenanted and agreed that the defendant should not be considered
a common carrier, that the mere happening of an accident should
not be deemed evidence of negligence and that defendant should
be liable only for proven acts of negligence. The conditions re-
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ferred 2to' are frequently the usual ones found in air transport
tickets.
The present motion for new trial is principally based upon alleged error of the Court in instructing the jury; that the defendant
was under a duty to exercise only ordinary care (while the instruction should have been to the effect that defendant was bound to
exercise utmost care) ; that the deceased would be held to have
assumed the extraordinary hazards of air transportation (when
in fact the deceased should not have been held to assume any such
risks). Additional error is ascribed in that as there is no evidence
to show defendant's freedom from negligence the evidentiary maxim
of res ipsa loquitur should have been given controlling force by the
jury and that because the jury had not so weighed the evidence the
verdict was contrary to the evidence and should be set aside.
The instructions of the Court are most interesting. 8 There is
1. The ticket provision follows: "Should the Company accept the holder
hereof for a flight in one of its airplanes, such acceptance shall not be deemed
to make the Company a common carrier, but it is specifically agreed and
understood between the holder and the Company that the Company is a
private carrier and is liable to the holder not as an insurer, but only for
proven negligence of its employees and agents and the mere occurence of an
accident resulting in injury or loss of life to the holder shall not be any
evidence of negligence."
2. See Carriage of Passengers by Air, E. A. Harriman, 1 JOURNAL Am
LAW 33, 36, 46 (1930); Aircraft Passenger Ticket Contracts, John K.
Edmunds, 1 JOURNAL AIR LAW 321, 322, et seq.
3. The portions of the instructions peculiar to this case follow:
0
"THE COURT: Gentlemen of the jury:
It becomes the duty of the Court to give you certain instructions regarding the law in the case presented to you for your consideration, and itis also
the privilege of the Court to comment upon the evidence if he sees fit. Such
comments, in the event they are made, are merely the Court's ideas of what
conclusions you may properly draw from the evidence. They are in no
sense binding upon you. You are at all times the sole judges of the effect
of evidence and of where the truth lies and within certain limitations, of the
inferences that may be drawn from a proven set of facts.
"In this action, E. M. Allison, as administrator of the estate of Thomas
J. Kelly, deceased, seeks to recover for the benefit of the surviving wife of
the decedent damages against the Standard Air Lines, Inc., arising by reason
of the death of Thomas J. Kelly.
"The complaint states that Mr. Kelly on March 30th, 1929, became a
passenger on the Defendant's airplane and in the vicinity of Banning in this
state, by re.on of the negligence of the Defendant in operating the airplane
was killed; that Blanche Vance Kelly, the surviving wife of the decedent,
has been damaged in the sum of $5000 [$50,0001 thereby.
"The Defendant admits that Thomas J. Kelly was a passenger upon its
airplane, and does not deny that he was killed in an accident. It does deny
that his death was caused by or was due to any negligence on the part of the
Defendant, or that the decedent's surviving wife has been damages in any
sum at all.
"As a further defense the Defendant claims that it operates an airline
to Tucson, Arizona, through the San Gorgonio Pass; that this pass is generally but not always free from clouds and fogs; that the airplane left the
airport at Los Angeles in good condition and order flying the usual route
under favorable weather conditions; that after entering the pass the plane
became enveloped in a fog completely obscuring the vision; that by reason
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no question but the Court was very lenient with the defendant's
position. Although the provisions of Section 2100- Civil Code of
California to the effect that "A carrier of persons for reward must
use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to
thereof the pilot lost his way, and the airplane was wrecked due to unforeseen events, and the Act of God.
"As a further defense, the Defendant claims that by reason of the conditions printed upon the ticket issued to the deceased, the Defendant is no t
liable except for the proven negligence of its employees and the mere occurrence of the accident, resulting in the death of the Decedent, is not of itself
evidence of negligence , . .
"Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interests
of another person, that degree of care, protection and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby, such other person suffers injury. It may
be active or passive in character and may consists in heedlessly doing an
improper thing or in heedlessly refraining from doing a proper thing. One
who does not do what he should do is chargeable with negligence equally with
him who does that which he should not do.
"Negligence is never presumed, but the burden is upon the plaintiff to
prove such negligence by a preponderance of the evidence and to further
prove that such negligence on the part of the Defendant was the proximate
cause of Mr. Kelly's death. On both of these issues, the burden is upon the
Plaintiff, and unless the Plaintiff proves such negligence and that it was the
proximate cause of the decease of said Kelly, there can be no recovery herein
and the verdict must be for the Defendant and against the Plaintiff.
"Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred- It is the efficient cause, which
acts and sets the other cause in operation.
"No one is responsible for the results of an unavoidable accident nor for
casualties which have not been known to occur before, and which might
not reasonably have been anticipated, and a Defendant is not liable for an
injury which is not caused by his negligence but which results from some
overwhelming natural agency over which he has no control.
"One who, without negligence on his part is suddenly confronted with
imminent dajnger or seeming imminent danger is not required to exercise that
degree of care and skill which is required in the commission of an-act after
careful deliberation.; he is required to act only as a reasonably prudent man
would act under similar circumstances. Accordingly, where a situation requides an immediate choice between alternative courses of conduct, negligence may not be inferred from an unwise choice, if a reasonable man under
similar circumstances, would choose similarly.
"One of the defenses in this case interposed by the Defendant is by
reason of a ticket issued to the decedent, the Defendant could be liable only
for negligence. In other words, it seeks to differentiate between the position
of the Defendant in this case and what is known as a common carrier of
passengers. You are instructed that the law does not permit such a difference arising by reason of the issuane of a ticket. The issuance of a ticket

with provisions printed theron such as have been placed in evidence here

does not change the relations of the parties to this action.
"If you should find from the evidence that the pilot Everitt acted in

such a manner as a person of ordinary prudence and caution and skill
would use under the same circumstances, he was not negligent. He was
only required to exercise such care and skill as is ordinarily possessed by

those engaged in the same business or art, and if you find from the evidence

that he exercised such care and skill, he was not negligent although the
danger might have been avoided if he had acted in a different manner; hence
his acting in the particular manner which he did would not necessarily be
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that end a reasonable degree of skill" were incorporated in the
instructions still the instruction following practically nullified the
former's effect. After stating to the jury the requirement of utmost care and diligence the Court proceeded to say that this demand
did not impose upon the carrier the duty to "exercise all the care,
negligence merely because there may have been a safer manner of doing
it. All of the circumstances attending the transaction must be taken into
consideration. However, these circumstances must be those which the evidence shows may reasonably be supposed to have been known to him and
to have influenced his mind at the time, for after an event has transpired it
is often easy to demonstrate means whereby it might have been prevented
from occurring.
"If you should find from the evidence that the pilot Everitt was an
experienced and skillful pilot, and without any negligence on his part
encountered fog conditions, and that bringing to bear all his previous
experience and skill he weighed the facts and circumstances surrounding him
and of which he had knowledge and decided upon a course of action which
he tried to carry out, that is to make an emergency landing, then his want
of success would be due to error of judgment and not to negligence. That
is, if he exercised his best judgment and if his acts would have been
approved by competent experts.
"You are instructed that the carrier of persons for reward must use
the utmost of care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide
everything necessary for that purpose and must exercise toward that end a
reasonable degree of skill.
"The carrier of persons for reward is bound to provide vehicles fit for
that purpose and is not excused for failure in this respect by any degree
of care.
"While the law demands the utmost care for the safety of passengers,
it does not require airplane companies to exercise all the care, skill and
diligence of which the human mind can conceive nor such as will free
the transportation of passengers from all possible perils. The deceased in
this case necessarily took upon himself all the usual and ordinary perils
incident to airplane travel and if you find from the evidence that the Defendant exercised all the care, skill and diligence required by law as
defined in these instructions and that nevertheless the accident occurred,
the Defendant would not be responsible therefor, and your verdict should be
for the Defendant. A carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its
passengers and is not bound absolutely and at all events to carry them
safely and without injury. All passengers take the risk of those dangers
which cannot be averted by the carrier by the exercise of the degree of
care which the law requires.
"The Defendant in this case, in addition. to its defense that it was not
guilty of negligence has presented the defense that the accident in question
was due to unforeseen events, inevitable accident or Act of God. You are
advised that if either of these defenses are established by the evidence, the
Plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict must be for the Defendant.
"No matter how great and imminent might have been the danger of
serious consequences of an accident, the Plaintiff would not be entitled to
recover if the death of Thomas J. Kelly was the result of an inevitable or
unavoidable accident; that is, if the accident could not have been prevented
by the exercise of that degree of care and caution required of the Defendant under the instructions heretofore given. A pure accident without
negligence on the part of the Defendant is not actionable, and if you are
ionvinced that the accident was of such character, it would come under the
head of an inevitable accident, then in such event, the Plaintiff could not
recover.
"There is in the law of accidents the further principle that I will briefly
state to you. When any person is confronted with a sudden emergency, he
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skill and diligence of which the human mind can conceive nor such
as will free the transportation of passengers from all possible perils."
The doctrine of assumed risks is definitely injected into the
case by the Court. "The deceased in this case necessarily took
is not required to exercise the same degree of caution, that natural and
deliberate judgment exercised when there is plenty of time to determine
what would be the wise thing to do. The law takes note of those things.
"Now gentlemen, with reference to the application of these instructions
to these particular facts, I feel like observing to you that of course it
is admitted Mr. Kelly was a passenger for hire upon this airplane. It is
uncontradicted that the airplane was sufficient for its purpose. In fact, its
capacity was more than its load. It was inspected as required by the
government regulations; that the air was clear and suitable for flying when
it left Los Angeles. We have no direct evidence as to when or where it
encountered the fog. It is without dispute that it circled the Tri-City Airport
several times and was later seen by several of the witnesses, you will
remember their names, who describe it as flying around in the vicinity of
the place where the accident occurred. Several of the witnesses described it
as at times invisible because of the fog. Other witnesses that it appeared and
later disappeared in the fog. It emerged from the fog and later disappeared
into the fog.
"There is considerable contradiction as to how high the fog was or
what the visibility was. That you must determine for yourselves from a
consideration of all the evidence. The testimony of all the witnesses is such
that you must reasonably draw the inference that the plane was off its
course and had lost its bearings. Whether or not the terrain was visible to
the aviator may be reasonably doubted from the evidence. Undoubtedly
it was not always visible. As I remember, several witnesses heard the
plane, when they could not see it. One witness, I believe, stated the plane
appeared to be directly overhead, yet was obscured from his view by the
fog. All the expert testimony seems to agree that in the opinion of the
witnesses testifying, the pilot was seeking a landing place. Those, however,
were all witnesses presented by the Defendant. The Plaintif! contends
that by rejecting the landing place which the Plaintiff claims must have
been visible, and seeking to find his way out of the fog, he suffered this
accident. The Plaintiff, as I understand its position, maintains that it was
negligent to attempt to fly through fog in any event; that not to have
landed at the Tri-City Airport, and not to have landed in the field or in
the places where a landing might have been made in the vicinity of the
accident, constituted negligence.
"There is one feature in this case, however, to which I desire to call
your particular attention. That is, that there is no witness, no living witness,
who is able to tell us what the aviator actually saw. One of the experts stated
with reference to his circling over the airport-the Tri-City Airport, that
it might have been he saw what he thought was clear weather, or clearing
atmospheric conditions beyond him. Applying the principle regarding the
error of judgment, which you will bear in mind, if in the judgment of this
aviator he saw what happened to be favorable conditions ahead of him,
then the Defendant is not to be held for negligence because he chose that
course rather than to land upon the field in safety.
"Now, this is more or less of a new science, as we all recognize, and
admittedly it is a branch of the law where we have very few precedents,
that is adjudicated cases. In order to hold the Defendant for negligence,
you must, as I explained to you, find that the pilot in this case-because the
pilot represents the Defendant-the corporation is able to act only through
its employee in this case, and therefore the pilot in this case is for all
purposes of the case, so far as your verdict goes, the Defendant itself.
The pilot must have done something which good judgment did not approve,
or would not approve, and on account of the fact that we cannot know
what the aviator saw, what appeared to him, it is a rather difficult thing
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upon himself all the usual and ordinary perils incident to airplane
travel
The high point of the case is the rejection, either by the Court,
or by the jury, of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The judge did
not instruct on this doctrine and in absence of direct evidence as
to the exact cause of the accident the jury did not employ this principle in establishing the preponderance of the evidence for the plaintiff. It cannot be said of course, that the jury did not call upon
this maxim and reject it, but such an operation is highly improbable
in view of the lack of specific instruction from the Court.
California law controls this case. The ticket for transportation was purchased in California. There is no evidence of intent of either party contrary to the assumption that California law
would control construction of the contract. The alleged tort occurred in California. The Court trying the case sat in California.'
In 1895 the Supreme Court of California in the leading case
of Judson v. Giant Powder Company' definitely established the rule
of res ipsa loquitur as a part of the jurisprudence of that State.
Quoting from Shearman and Redfield on Negligence the Court
there announced the principle that has been applied in California
Courts in numerous cases and respecting varying sets of facts since
that time.
p. 556: "'When a thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who havel the management
use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of explanation by the defendant that the accident arose from want of care.'"

The element of contractual relationship does not enter into the
question of the application of this doctrine. In the Judson case
plaintiff sued for damage resulting from explosion of defendant's
dynamite factory, operated next door to plaintiff. Plaintiff's factory was wrecked by the explosion. The Court held that measured
by the pronouncement of the rule as stated in Shearman and Redfield, quoted above, res ipsa loquitur should be applied, Page 556:
"Tested by this rule, no question of contractual relation could form
an element in the case," and judgment was given the plaintiff
"'Undoubtedly the presumption (of negligence) has been more
in my judgment to know that the conditions that appeared to him did not
justify his doing what he did.
"You gentlemen are the exclusive judges of the evidence in this case,
and you are to make up your minds from the evidence before you what
the situation was.
"One other thing may be suggested to you. An airplane is a thing that
must be kept going, and going at a very rapid rate, to insure anything like
safety. If a man sees danger ahead of him when he is driving an automobile, he may stop. It is not so with an airplane. Stopping means danger,
often death, unless of course a landing is made. . ....
(For a full report
of the instructions, see 1930 U. S. Av. R. 292.)
4. See Carriage of Passengers by Air, supra note 2, p 47; Code of
Civil Procedure, California, Sec. 1857.
5. 107 Cal. 549
6. Sec. 60.
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frequently applied in cases against carriers of passengers than in
any other class but there is no foundation in authority or reason
for any such limitation of the rule of evidence. The presumption
originates from the nature of the act, not from the nature of the
relations between the parties.'7 Presumptions arise from the doctrine of possibilities. The future is measured by the past, and presumptions are created from the experience of the past." The doctrine has been applied in California in cases of runaway horses,9
dropping of mechanic's tools on passers-by, 10 falling of tile,," explosion of gas main in man-hole with resultant injury to one not
employed by defendant,"2 explosion of gas tanks1" and in the case
of death resulting from an automobile accident, wherein the decedent
was an unpaying guest of the defendant" to name but a few examples. It may be safely said that this rule of evidence will be
applied by the California Courts in any negligence case "where
in the ordinary course of events the accident complained of would
not happen except from the negligence of the defendant. ' 15 In
the case of aircraft, then, the proper determination of the question of
applicability of the rule goes to the law of averages. In the ordinary
course of air operation does the kind of accident under scrutiny
ordinarily happen except from the negligence of the operator?
Putting the question in this form it can be readily seen that such
elements as contractual relation-whether or not the passenger has
attempted to bargain away his cause of action, or whether or not
he has attempted to nullify rules of evidence by the devise of agreement with his carrier-are at once excluded from our inquiry. Nor
does the kind of carrier-whether common, private, or quasi-common, or contract-have anything to do with the question of application of this rule of evidence.
"Risks of transportation" or "risks of air transportation"
should be considered at this juncture. If the law of averages
shows that there is probability or even great possibility of accident
due to carriage by air, then undoubtedly the passenger can be charged
with assumption of risk and in addition the rule of res ipsa loquitur
7. The Court quoting from Rose v. Stephens, 11 F. 438
8. Judson v. Giant Powder Comrpany, supra note 5, at page 555.
9. Breidenbach v. McCormick Co.. 20 Cal. App. 184, 128 p. 423.
10. Dixon v. Pluns, 98 Cal. 384, 33 p. 268
11. Michener v. Hutton, 203 Cal. 604, wherein ard collected many
interesting illustrations of application of the rule.
12. Smith v. Southern Counties Gas Co.,.89 Cal. App. 81. This case
would seeM to be an extreme one. Lighting a match in a man-hole of a
gas company might be easily held to be known to be dangerous by any
person of ordinary intelligence, yet the Court said the resulting accident
was "such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if thosLe
who have the management use proper care" The Supreme Court of California
gave its implied approval in denying a hearing after decision by the
District Court of Appeal.
13. Sistrunk v. Texas Holding Company, 88 Cal. App. 698.
14. Brown v. Davis 84 Cal. App. 180.
15. Carlsen v. Diehl 57 Cal. App. 731, 737.
15. Lippert v. Pacific Sugar Corporation,33 Cal. App. 198, 208.
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cannot be brought into play, for it cannot be said that in the ordinary
course of air operation the kind of accident involved does not
occur except from negligence. If air passage is proven ordinarily
dangerous then one cannot assume negligence from the ordinary
occurrence. The kinds of air operation then must be examined.
It is generally known throughout the aeronautical fraternity that
the element of danger varies in intensity with the type of operation
involved. Stunt flying is generally dangerous. Straight-line passenger flying on scheduled runs is not. Military flying may occupy
the middle ground. The air mail goes through where a passenger
pilot "fears to tread." Statistics will very likely show that carrying
the mail by air involves more hazard to the pilot than does passenger
carrying to the passengers and crew.
In the instant case can the aeronautical industry contend that
ordinarily accidents such as happened at Banning occur without
negligence on the part of the operator? Such a contention, if urged
successfully, would establish straight-line scheduled passenger flying
as an extremely unattractive method of transportation and would
undoubtedly kill air passenger business. If the facts prove, as we
are led to believe by air traffic departments, that this kind of flying is very safe, then it would seem that res ipsa loquitur will be
applied in accidents in such operation, at least in California.
It should be added that the rule above discussed is merely a
presumption of evidence, that it may be overturned by other competent evidence, and that where there is no question as to the cause
of the accident the rule has no application whatsoever. 15 In Atkin6
the California Court points out that the
son v. United Railroads"
pleading of specific acts of negligence precludes reliance on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Missouri, Kansas, and Illinois; that
the doctrine may be u.sed regardless of evidence on specific acts
of negligence in Washington, Virginia, Massachusetts and Tennessee, and that the rule of application in Georgia, Indiana and
California permits application of the rule even though specific acts
of negligence are pleaded but relieves the defendant from disproving negligence on all other grounds. In other words in California
the rule applies-where specific acts of negligence are pleadedonly to the acts so pleaded.
The disposition of the trial judge in the Allison cases to "go
easy" with the airline company, no doubt on account of his appreciation of the difficulties of the infant air transport industry, is extremely interesting. This phase of judicial reflection can possibly
be traced to the very effective good will campaign of the aviation
organizations. Perhaps when Colonel Lindbergh flew the Atlantic
he started the chain of events which had its culmination in the
kindly attitude of this Court toward aeronautics. However, the
question may well be raised of the lasting effects of a judicial policy
which tends to favor a particular endeavor. Does the enterprise grow
as strong as though it were faced with responsibilities the equal
16. 71 Cal. App. 82.
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of its competitors? Finally will not aviation progress more surelyif not as rapidly-if it is forced to face the music with all other
economic pursuits than it will if it is constantly coddled, excused,
babied and impressed with the fact that it is infantile in character
and that it cannot stand on its own merits. 7
Member of the California Bar. THOMAS HART KENNEDY.
PUBLIC INTEREST, CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY APPLIED TO
BROADCASTING
STATIONS-HETERODYNE
INTERFERENCE
ON
REGIONAL CHANNELS-APPLICATION OF DAVIS AMENDMENT TO OVERQUOTA STATE AND TO COMMUNITIES WITHIN THE STATE.

In Havens & Martin, Inc. v. Federal Radio Commission, No.
5141 (not yet reported, opinion filed December 1, 1930), the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed a decision of the
Federal Radio Commission denying an application by broadcasting
station WMBG, Richmond, Va., for increase of power from 100
to 500 watts and for change of frequency from 1210 to 1240 kc.
The Commission's decision had been based in part on findings
(1) that a granting of the application would cause serious heterodyne
interference to WGHP at Detroit, Mich.,' operating at 1240 kc.
with 1000 watts, the distance separation being about 460 miles, and
(2) that the State of Virginia already enjoyed more than a fair and
equitable proportion of the facilities available to the Second Zone
upon the basis of population, and the city of Richmond already enjoyed a full share of the radio facilities of the state. With regard
to these findings, the court's opinion says:
"These findings if justified by the record are sufficient to sustain
the refusal of appellant's application. Radio Act of 1927, Sec. 4, 44
Stat. 1162. They are contested by appellant, and the question presented
by this appeal is whether the findings are manifestly against the evidence contained in the record. Technical Radio Laboratory v. Federal
Radio Commission, 36 Fed. (2d) 111. Upon a review of the record we
are of the opinion that none of the findings is against the evidence."
This re-affirmation of the rule announced in the Technical
Radio Laboratory case, which is repeated in the court's opinion filed
the same day in W. 0. Ansley, Jr. v. Federal Radio Commission,
No. 5149 (not yet reported, opinion filed Dec. 1, 1930), removes
the doubt which was occasioned by what seemed to be adherence
to a somewhat different rule in Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v.
Federal Radio Commission, 37 Fed. (2d) 993.
The court's opinion reviews briefly the conflicting evidence in
the record on the subject of interference, and said that, on the facts
17. See "What's the Matter with Aviation", Bogart Rogers, Liberty
Magazine, November 22, 1930, page 16 for a frank discussion of the effects
of too much preference on the aeronautical industry.
1. The Commission's statement also pointed out that the State of
Michigan was under-quota under the Davis Amendment, and should not have
its broadcasting facilities further reduced by interference such as would result
from the requested assignment.
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shown by the record, it was not error for the Commission to rely
upon the testimony of its official engineer. The opinion also briefly
reviews the opposing contentions as to the present quotas of Virginia and of the city of Richmond, saying
"An analysis of the quota to which the State is entitled according
to population discloses that it is over its quota in respect to national,
regional and local facilities."
Thus the Commission's method
of calculating state quotas under
implied approval of the court.
Commission should have charged

(which has since been changed)
the Davis Amendment receives the
Appellant had contended that the
WJSV, Mt. Vernon, Va., to Wash-

ington, D. C., but the court held that "the evidence

.

.

.

tends

to prove that the principal studio of WJSV is located in Virginia."
The court impliedly approves the Commission's finding that Richmond is not "radio isolated," and the Commission's position that,
since there were other localities in Virginia in need of broadcasting
facilities which were applying therefore, any new construction should
''go to some place where there are as yet no stations."
The decision (together with the decision in the Ansley case)
is chiefly important in the assistance it gives to those who are seeking to counteract the great pressure constantly being exercised on
the Commission further to deteriorate the condition of regional
channels by insufficient geographical separations between stations
assigned to them.
Louis G. CALDWELL.
Of the Chicago and District of Columbia Bars.
PUBLIC

INTEREST, CONVENIENCE

AND

NECESSITY

APPLIED TO

INTERFERENCE ON
REBROADCASTING
STAT'ONS-HETERODYNE
GIONAL CHANNELs-APPLICATION OF DAVIS AMENDMENT TO OVERQUOTA STATE AND TO COMMUNITIES WITHIN STATE.

In W. 0. Ansley, Jr. v. Federal Radio Commission, No. 5149
(not yet reported, opinion filed December 1, 1930), the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed a decision of the Federal Radio Commission denying an application for permit to construct a new broadcasting station at Abilene, Texas, with unlimited
hours of operation, 1000 watts, on 550 kc.
A local broadcasting station, KFYO, operating at Abilene on
1420 kc. 100 watts (250 watts daytime) opposed the application
before the Commission on the ground that there was no necessity
for, and not sufficient patronage to support, two stations at Abilene.
A previous application by KFYO for an increase of power had been
refused. After finding from the evidence "that the local station had
signally failed to render efficient service to the people of Abilene and
vicinity, and that much objectionable matter had been broadcast by
it," and "that the appellant is an experienced broadcasting operator
of good character, and that he might confidently be expected to
conduct the new station, if established, in a satisfactory manner,"
the opinion says:
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"The present controversy, however, is not a personal one, nor a
competition between two broadcasting stations, but is to be governed
solely by a consideration of the public interests. Section 4, Radio Act
of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162."
The Commission's decision had been based on reasons in substance
as follows:
"(1) That the proposed station would result in the creation of
additional serious heterodyne interference with stations already constructed and operated on the same frequency; (2) that the State of
Texas already enjoyed more than a fair, equitable or statutory share of
available broadcasting facilities according to population; and (3) that
neither the radio needs nor the economic support of Abilene and vicinity justified the construction and operation of such a station."
The opinion says:
"The sole question before the Commission was whether the public
interest, convenience or necessity would be served by the granting of
appellant's application."
After reaffirming the rule laid down in the Technical Radio Laboratory case, the court held "that the decision is not manifestly against
the evidence."
The distance separation between Abilene and the nearest point
(St. Louis) at which an existing station was operating on 550 kc.
was 690 miles. On this subject the court uses language which is not
free from criticism when it says:
"It is true as urged by appellant that more or less heterodyne interference already occurs between other stations when broadcasting simultaneously upon this channel, and that such interference is likely to
affect such broadcasting by regional stations, and that it is necessary
to balance the amount and importance of the service a radio station
may give against the degree of interference it may cause. General
Electric Company v. Federal Radio Commission, 31 Fed. (2d) 630."
This is true of the particular channel involved on the appeal, 550
kc., which, under sub-paragraph D, Par. 4 of General Order 40, was
one of five frequencies which might be used by stations in all five
zones broadcasting simultaneously. It was recognized that interference would inevitably take place on these frequencies. They
should not, however, be confused with the thirty-five regional channels designated in sub-paragraph C, Par. 4 of the same general
order, which were to be used by stations in not less than two nor
more than three zones (with a limited exception where interference
would not be caused).
The court again gives implied approval to the Commission's
method (since changed) of calculating state quotas, saying
"This finding of the Commission is presumed to be correct, and
while exact accuracy in such a computation is doubtless impossible, the
finding is not refuted by the evidence."
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The court discusses and disposes of appellant's contention that the
Commission had discriminated against Abilene and a large area of
Western Texas which is commercially tributary to it.
The appeal raised, and the briefs of the parties discussed,
many important and interesting procedural questions, but the court
refrains from passing on them, other than to overrule all of appellant's contentions on such matters in a sentence at the close of the
opinion.
Louis G. CALDWELL.
Of the Chicago and District of Columbia Bars.
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[U. S. D. C. Ohio]-The defendants established an extensive airport and
flying school across the public highway from the improved country estate of
the plaintiffs, situated in a farming region, and twelve miles from the city
of Cleveland. Within a week of the time in which the defendants purchased
their property, and before improvements commenced, plaintiffs complained
that the prospective airport would be a nuisance. The defendants disregarded
the protest and proceeded with improvements, and this action for an injunction was promptly commenced. Held: The court enjoined blowing dust
upon plaintiffs' property, the dropping of circulars, and flying over plaintiffs'
estate at less than 500 feet, including the flying below 500 feet in taking
off and landing. The airport was held not to be a nuisance per se because
such a holding would be inconsistent with recent Ohio legislation, authorizing municipalities to acquire real este for airports: Ohio Gen. Code Sec.
3677. Injunctions were denied which were sought on the ground that private
nuisances were constituted (1) by ordinary flying taking place above 500
feet in altitude because unsupported by evidence showing that such flying
interfered with the comfortable enjoyment of the country estate or the
"effective possession" of the plaintiffs; (2) by the noise involved in warming
up the airplanes a quarter of a mile from plaintiffs' dwelling, because the
noise was found to bq less than "plaintiffs might be compelled to endure
from industrial plants which might properly locate in this locality"; (3) by
the attraction of crowds for exhibitions, business, or curiosity, because the
crowds so attracted were no different from those attracted by amusement
parks; (4) by the lighting system for night operations until the kind
to be installed and the inconvenience following were determined; and lastly
(5) by the decrease in value as a country, estate because this was denied
to be ground for injunction unless the airport was otherwise a nuisance,
and as ultimate financial loss was not certain because of the increased value
of the land for purposes connected with the airport: Swetland v. Curtiss
Airports Corp. (N. D. Ohio. 1930) 41 F. (2d.) 929.
The prayer for injunction against flying over plaintiffs' estate is, for
aviation, by far the most important question raised and alone will be
considered in this comment.
The actual decision of the case, as distinquished from the reasoning
advanced to support it, appears to be an admirable compromise of the conflicting interests involved-those of the land owner to be undisturbed in
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the use and enjoyment of his land, and those of the public in the newest
medium of travel-in which certain burdens are cast upon each litigant.
The injunction against flying over property at less than 500 feet, even when
taking off and landing, adds a large financial burden to airport operators,
because airports will either have to be much larger than heretofore, or must
acquire extensive air rights over neighboring land, since a large loaded
plane today covers a distance of over a mile before reaching 500 feet in
altitude. This decision is more severe than that advanced in the recent
case of Smith v. Newt England Aircraft Co.. (Mass. 1930) 170 N. E. 385
where flying over wood land at the extremity of the country estate was
declared to be 9 trespass at 100 feet ir height, although no injunction was
granted because of procedural technicalities, but where flying between 100
and 500 feet was left undetermined as to whether it constituted a trespass.
On the other hand, the land owner was not sustained in his claim of property
rights based on the literal interpretation of the maxim cuius est solum, ejus
est usque ad coelum et inferos, which would have given him exclusive
proprietary interests in the superjacent airspace without limit, because, by
refusing to enjoin flying above 500 feet, the court denied the right to
maintain trespass quare clausum fregit, which otherwise would have followed for every invasion regardless of height or inconvenience. In the Smith
case, supra, the plaintiff did not contend for a literal interpretation of the
maxim, but his contention, that the maxim gave the ground owner exclusive
property rights up to 500 feet, was denied.
The court's decision is probably based entirely on the finding that a
nuisance was maintained, and not on the ground that trespass was committed.
The theories upon which the injunction was based are important for aeronautical development because of the precedent created for future decisions.
The injunction could have been based either on an action of trespass quare
clausum fregit, or on an action to abate a nuisance. The following passage
appears to summarize the reasons for the court's decision: "In view of
the magnitude of defendants' contemplated operations, in the opinion of
the court the probability is that if defendants were permitted in taking off
and landing to fly at altitudes lower than 500 feet, such flying, if it would
not constitute trespasses, would at least constitute the maintenance of a
nuisance." (instant case, 942-italics added). Clearly the decision rests on the
finding of a nuisance, but it is doubtful whether the decision rests in addition
on a second finding that trespasses were committed because of the qualifying
word "if". However, if the court intended to base its decision merely on
nuisance, it chose a very circumlocutious way to do so, because over threequarters of the opinion is devoted to an inquiry into the case, maxim, and
statutory authority on the extent and nature of property in airspace which
is not involved in a private nuisance because the ownership of property at
the spacial origin of the nuisance is immaterial. The extent of the landowners property in airspace was relevant only in deciding within what
region an action of trespass could be sustained, and the court advances the
test of "effective possession" for that very purpose. The court declares
that "if this court were called upon to designate the upper limit of effective
possession under the facts of this case, it would, in the first instance, fix
it at an altitude of 500 feet" (instant case, 942). This shows the court
recognized that an adjudication of the trespass question was unnecessary for
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tho present injunction, although personally believing that such flying constituted a trespass. However, if trespass is considered one of the grounds
for the decision, then the opinion, that effective possession only extended up
to 500 feet is the sole basis for restricting the injunction to flying below
500 feet, unless such altitude is considered the lower extent of "the airspace
normally traversed by the aviator" in which the court had found that exclusive proprietary rights did not exist by the common law or constitutional
guarantee (instant case, 938). There is no doubt but that the court advanced a convenient verbal test for determining when trespass was maintainable and told how to apply that test in this case. However, the test was mere
dicta unless the single sentence, above quoted, placing the whole decision on
nuisance, was not exclusive, i. e. was only one of the bases for the decision.
The basis of the decision is further obscured by the striking coincidence
that the minimum safe altitude for flying, the scope of effective possession,
and the limit of nuisance from flying, are all placed at 500 feet. That three
so unrelated findings, dependent on different considerations, should exactly
correspond, although partially explained by the evidence, appears to be more
than a coincidence, and raises the query of whether the minimum safe
altitude regulation was not erroneously employed as a handy tool by which
the trespass and nuisance question could be readily settled. An examination of the Federal and State Statutes, and the elements of trespass an~d
nuisance show the illogical foundation for the coincidence.
The Federal Air Commerce Act of 1926 (49 U. S. C. A. 171 et seqa;
44 Stat. 568 et seq) cannot properly be construed, as often misunderstood,
to be a prescription of property rights in the airspace by the provision that
"navigable airspace" should be the "airspace above the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce under section 3,
and such navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of
interstate and foreign air navigation." Sec. 10, 49 U. S. C. A. 180. The
Act primarily sought to advance aviation by making flying safe; this the
Federal government had a right to regulate by its constitutional control over
interstate commerce, The minimum height regulation of 500 feet for
flying in the open country assumed the right to fly, and cannot be construed
as expressly authorizing flight down to the altitude of 500 feet, but only
as deciding that at the present stage of aviation interstate flying is not
safe lower than 500 feet. The only possible effect that the Act had on
property rights was to help determine when flying was so dangerous as to
be a nuisance which, of course, is only one of the grounds for a nuisance.
If the Secretary of Commerce, after consideration of the evidence at his
disposal, found that flying below the minimum height was generally unsafe,
then the presumption could be raised that such flying interfered with the
physical enjoyment of the proprietary occupant so as to constitute a
nuisance.
State statutes, such as the Ohio Act, 113 Ohio Laws (1929) 28, are
based on the State's police power, and under this power minor infringements
of property rights are permitted in order to adjust conflicting rights, and as
long as the exercise is reasonable there is no violation of the general constitutional guarantee of property: Block v. Hirsh (1921) 256 U. S. 135, 155;
41 Sup. Ct. 458, 459: Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., supra 390. However, the Ohio Act did not directly attempt to employ the police power
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to take away property rights in the airspace by fixing the lawful altitude
for avigation, as did the Massachusetts Statute (Gen. Laws, Ch. 90, sec.
55, as amended by Acts of 1928, ch. 388, sec. 10), but purported to "acquiesce
in and to adopt the provisions of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, so far
as the proper altitudes of flight are concerned." (instant case, 939). Whether
the adoption of the Federal Act can be considered an exercise of the State's
police power, and thus a conscription of the uncertain property rights in
the airspace above 500 feet is not entirely clear, though probable: Fagg
"Incorporating Federal Law into State Legislation." (1930) 1 JouR. AIR LAw
199; Remarks of Kintz, 1 JOUR. AIR LAw 445; Lee, "State Adoption and
Enforcement of Federal Air Navigation Law" (1930) 16 A. B. A. Jour. 715.
The court's conclusion is that "We cannot agree with the contention that
this establishment of a 500 foot minimum altitude rue is an unreasonable or
arbitrary exercise of the police power, in that it denies effective possession
of their property to plaintiffs and amounts to an unlawful taking of plaintiffs' property without due process of law." (instant case, 940). While the
passage expressly declared the Statutes constitutional, it also negatived all
effect on property rights, which is supported by the earlier statement that
neither "legislative body, in establishing the regulations regarding air navigation therein set forth, considered that there was involved the taking of any
property" (instant case, 934-italics by court).
The determination of when an action of trespass can be maintained
depends on the definition of property, i. e., how far airspace is property
reduced to ownership. Legislative provisions and statutes are powerless to
destroy property rights and titles contrary to due process of law: Logan:
"Aircraft Law-Made Plain" (1928) 20-21. Before deciding that the property owner cannot maintain trespass for every invasion above his land, the
court was compelled to find that by the common! law the subjacent owner
never owned the airspace, or that his ownership only extended to a certain
height. If the contrary were found, a constitutional amendment would be
necessary before aviation could proceed. The standards employed by the
courts to determine the subjects of property which are protected by the
constitutional guarantee are obscure, although admittedly very broad. It is
contended that the guarantee should be interpreted to refer to property as
understood at the time of adopting the constitution: Hine, "Home versus
aeroplane" (1930) 16 A. B. A. Jour. 217 (citing only Gibbons v. Ogden
(1824) 9 Wheat. 1, 190, 6 L. Ed. 23, 68); Note (1893) 7 Harv. L. Rev.
300; Shattuck "Meaning of the term 'Liberty'" (1891) 4 Harv. L, Rev. 365,
387. However, the guaranted has probably been extended beyond the
original intention by including intangible elements, while at the same time
all property rights have become less absolute by being made relative to the
general welfare: Swayze, "Judicial Construction of Fourteenth Amendment"
(1912) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 13; on inclusion of intangible elements, see,
Truax v. Corrigan (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 327, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 127, and
Bogani v. Perotti (1916) 224 Mass. 152, 154, 112 N. E. 853, 855; on relativity
of private property rights, see, Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter (1908)
209 U. S. 349, 355, 28 Sup. Ct. 529, 531.
The plaintiff relied "strongly" upon the maxim cujus est solum to show
that the landowner had exclusive property rights in the airspace. The court
held the maxim was an "invocation of the doctrine of stare decisis" (instant
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case, 936) which no decided case had directly applied to the upper airspace
because that space was unused prior to the development of aviation, and
of no value, except in connection with the soil, and consequently the source
of no litigation: Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 945. While the lack of case
authority to support the maxim was balanced by the old prevailing belief
that the maxim was accepted law, the court refused to follow customary
belief which usually directs the course of law in such a balance, and was
swayed by modern needs and declared: "No constitutional or legislative
provisions or statutes have heretofore established any exclusive proprietary
rights in the landowner to the superincumbent airspace normally traversed
by the aviator" (instant case, 938). But see, "Legislative Jurisdiction over
Flying" (1930) 8 Canadian Bar Jour. 587, 589. The airspace normally
traversed by the aviator presumably extends down to the minimum safe
altitude established by the Secretary of Commerce, which regulation apparently is employed indirectly to fix the lower height of the above general
denial of property.
The court contemplated sustaining the action of trespass against flying
below the minimum safe altitude when it declared, "Below such altitudes
the Act' does not apply to this case, and the court must protect the rights
of the plaintiffs if there is an unreasonable interference with them, by
the application of the rule of effective possession" (instant case, 442).
While examining the nature and scope of the trespass action, the court quoted
Pollock's suggestion "that the scope of possible trespass is limited by that
of possible effective possession" (Pollock, "Torts", (13th ed.) 362) and
remarked that he "is much quoted as announcing the rule that a landowner has an exclusive right to the airspace above his land only to the extent
that such ownership is necessary to and for effective possession." (instant
case, 937) Apparently without questioning its meaning or previous applications, the court adopts the test of effective possession for determining the
scope of thq action of trespass. As previously shown, the court suggested
500 feet as the proper height of effective possession for this case, and later
infers that it is an exceptional case which does not interfere with the
property owner's effective possession by a flight below 500 feet :-"The right
to fly at lower altitudes (save in exceptional cases which might not be
regarded as trespasses) must in such instances( (landing and taking off) be
legally obtained by the aviator." (instant case, 942-italics added). The reasons
which led' the court to reach the same altitude) as that fixed by the minimum
safe altitude regulation do not appear other than in the judge's opinion,
more applicable to nuisance, that probably "the plaintiffs will be amply
protected if the flights of the defendants -are made at minimum altitudes of
500 feet." (instant case, 942) It is believed the court probably used the
considerations which determine the distance at which a flying airplane ceases
to cause a nuisance, in addition to the regulation of the Secretary of Commerce, to locate the extent of effective possession. Later it will be shown
that effective possession has no fixed meaning and can be employed to designate almost any height the particular judge desires.
The maintenance of a nuisance has nothing to do with the extent of
the plaintiff's property, or the safe altitude of flight, with the single exception of danger, but involve4 only the unreasonable impairment of the use
and enjoyment actually being made of the property occupied. How far away a
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nuisance originates and the nature of the physical origin are generally immaterial if there is an actual nuisance, consideration having been given to
the character of the neighborhood in which the plaintiff's land is situated.
The decision that only flying up to 500 feet was a nuisance appears to rest
on the same observations as those fixing the extent of effective possession,
with the added ground' that "counsel for the plaintiffs have offered no evidence which would indicate that flying at 500 feet would interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of their country estate by the plaintiffs" (instant
case, 942). The court nowhere explained the exact manner in which the
flight of an airplane constitutes a nuisance, and, in view of the importance
of the decision, it seems that the court might have explained the kind of
an interference it was considering when fixing 500 feet as the limit for the
injunction. The flight of an airplane may affect the use and enjoyment
of property by noise, exhaust, unsightliness, shade, and danger, of which
noise and danger are the most important. Nuisance constituted by danger from
the falling of the airship itself is alone related to the minimum safe
altitude of flight, as has been shown, but the height of flight, independent
of safety, affects all the sources of interference which flying may create,
as does the kind and size of the plane and frequency of flight. Moreover,
the adoption of a single altitude overlooks the fact that flying directly over
plaintiffs' dwelling at 500 feet might be a nuisance, while flying the same
height might not be when over the borders of the estate a quarter or half
mile away. The finding that the whole estate in the present case was
highly improved distinguished this case from the Smith case, supra, where
the borderland was unimproved brushland. The court to some extent recognized the arbitrariness of its decision by expressing a willingness to raise
the altitude of the injunction if defendants' flying increased and changed
so that flying immediately above 500 feet became a nuisance, and by expressing no such willingness to lower the altitude in the injunction if
improvements in the industry permitted lowering the safe minimum altitude
of flight.
The danger of objects falling from airplanes and the danger of the
airship itself crashing are alone peculiar to nuisance created by flying
airplanes. Railroads probably cause as much noise, and yet by the power
of eminent domain, conferred upon them by the legislatures, the railroads
can cross any property3 by paying compensation. It is contended that while
it is proper to apply the ordinary rules of nuisance for interfering with
flying over neighboring lands, some liberality should be allowed in the
rules of nuisance against flying directly over a plaintiffs' own property,
because he cannot abate the disturbance so caused, which does not amount
to nuisances, by acquiring additional air rights to protect his fanciful enjoyment, other than those the mere ownership of the subjacent land confers,
unless he changes his occupation by constructing buildings: see, MacChesney,
"In Re: Rights of Land Owners with Reference to Operators of Aircraft."
(1930) 1 JouR. AIR LAw 338, 340. Men acquire country estates to avoid the
noise of city life and surround ther with woods to secure quiet and
isolation, but judging the woods alone and not as part of an entire estate,
as was done in the Smith case, supra, flying may be permitted as low as
100 feet over the brush borderland. In the present case the estate was ap-
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parently judged as a whole, thus partially explaining the single altitude
injunction.
The burden of proving damages in maintaining a nuisance, which is
not essential for trespass, makes the distinction as to which action the
decision rests upon of extreme practical importance irrespective of the
property question and of the fact that every flight within the area of effective
possession might also theoretically be a nuisance. Damage actual proved
from specific flights is the basis of nuisance and the injunction extends only
to preventing further damage. Trespass is simpler in that it lies for every
invasion of property, and the plaintiff has only the burden of proving that
his property or his effective possession was invaded, which, however, may be
as great a burden as proving damage until definite presumptions are established by a series of cases depending on the character of the occupation of
the land.
The contention that the regulation of the Secretary of Commerce"Exclusive of taking off from or landing on an established landing field . .
aircraft shall not be flown . . at a height less than 500 feet" (Air Com. Reg.
Ch. 7 Sec. 74G)--expressly authorized flying below 500 feet in taking off
and landing was firmly denied. "The exceptions . . in taking off and landing
were promulgated only to relieve the avigators from the penalties prescribed
by the air traffic rules" (instant case 942) This interpretation was consistent
with the view that thq regulation of avigation in the interests of safety was
the basis of the Act and avoided all question of the constitutionality of
the exception by the opinion previously expressed as to the general guarantee of property. Apparently as a result of this decision the Secretary of
Commerce has reworded the regulation, effective September 19, 1930, as
follows: "The minimum safe altitudes of flight in taking off or landing and
taking off or landing, are those
while flying over the property of another irq
at which such flights by, aircraft may be made without being in dangerous
proximity to persons or property on the land or water beneath, or unsafe
to the aircraft." The revised regulation does more than relieve the aviators
from the penalties for violating the air traffic rules: it purports to offer a
standard for judging when such flying is unsafe. The constitutionality of
the revised regulation is uncertain unless it can be openly held to be a
definite restriction of private property which is valid under some constitutional power, such as the police power. However, the regulation may be
upheld because of the interpretation which can be placed on the ambiguous
clause "dangerous proximity to persons or property." It is difficult to see
how safety for the owner beneath can necessitate flying at 500 feet at all
other times and not when taking off and landing-which is admittedly the
most dangerous.
What is effective possession? This court is probably the first to employ
the phrase to determine when an action of trespass is maintainable against
the "innocent passage" of an airplane. Although the entire question of
trespass is probably only dicta, the test of effective possession is one of the
most important suggestions advanced, The court makes no attempt to
define the phrase, and its suggestion of 500 feet as the proper scope in the
present situation does not reveal the logical considerations entering into
arriving at that altitude. At this point quotations may be examined from
the principal writers who have used the phrase and then the possible mean-
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ing of effective possession may be analyzed. Sir Frederick Pollock apparently
introduced the phrase by suggesting, as already quoted, "that the scope of
possible trespass is limited by that of possible effective possession:" Pollock,
supra. Unfortunately Pollock does not further elucidate. Kuhn, in 1910,
criticized the phrase, "Doubtless we may refer it to the essential requirement
of trespass quare clausum fregit that there should be possession, or the
right to possession, in the complaint. The suggestion is novel inasmuch as
it regards *this requirement as objective as well as subjective. But though
this phraseology has already gained currency, it is more specious than
precise, because the scope of effective possession as far as it concerns the
ai space, is indeterminate and will vary with the advance in the art of
air navigation. Furthermore it leaves open the air space for the acquisition
of rights not necessarily appurtenant to the right of enjoyment of the soil."
Kuhn, "The Beginning of an Aerial Law" (1910) 4 Am. Jour. of Int.
Law 109, 126. While apparently accepting the phrase, Rannells states:
"While this doctrine of effective possession does not flatly deny the maxim,
so as upon establishment to relieve the aerial traveler from all guilt of
trespass, it does originate a theory upon which the future air voyager
may reasonably expect to escape litigation except where he actually causes
damage .....
.but
this scope of 'effective possession', so strongly to be
depended upon by the traveler of the air, has never been determined; and will
not be unless arbitrarily by statute, since it must vary with the advance of
aerial navigation." Rannells "Aerial Navigation in the Law of Trespass"
(1919) 4 St. Louis Law Rev. 205, 206-7. This author believes "Germany
and Switzerland have incorporated the doctrine of effective possession into
their statutes :" supra, 207. The German Civil Code provides "the owner cannot prohibit interference which takes place at such heights or depths that he
has no interest in their exclusion." Loewy, trans., sec. 6 67 -in effect 1912.
The Code of the Canton of Grisons (Swiss, sec. 165 -in effect 1862) states
that "property in land extends to the airspace (above) and the earth beneath
as far as these may be of productive value to the owner." Rannells cites

as a "recent expositor of Pollock's doctrine" one who says "ownership to
the sky is a space of preferential use to the owner of the soil, and such use
is interfered with only when enjoyment of the soil is diminished:" 71
Central Law Jour. (1910) 1. Bogert, in commenting on Sec. 3 of the
Uniform State Laws which places ownership of air space in the owner of the

surface subject to a right of flight not interfering with the existing use of
the land or eminently dangerous to persons thereon, states that "the land
owner is belived to own the space above his surface as real property in so far
as he can and does make effectual use of it." Bogert, "Recent Developments
in the Law of Aeronautics" (1922) 8 Corn. Law Quart. 26, 32, note 24. Burdick states: "But it is reasonable to believe that passage through the air space
superadjacent to land at a height beyond that at which the owner of the soil
can exercise effective possession, will not be treated as a trespass." Burdick,
"Torts" (4th ed. 1926) 406. Hotchkiss concludes "that the maxim has in
practice given the lawn owner the right to the effective use of. his property
and its enjoyment, but that it has never given an absolute property right in
the air space above his land." Hotchkiss. "Aviation Law" (1928) 25. Ball
remarks: "Just what effective possession is, is obscure. Yet this doctrine
has been repeated unquestioningly by several writers (Rannells, and author
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of 71 Cent. Law Jour. 1). . . . Others set the limit at the height of actual
user as determined by buildings or other structures- (distinguishing "actual
user" from "effective possession"). . . . All of these limits were difficult both
of definition and of application." Ball, "The Vertical Extent of Ownership in
Land" (1928) 76 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 631, 641-2-bracketed remarks added.
But later Ball admits. although not favoring the above theories, that "it is
probably true that we do not have definite disproof of the 'zone theories'"
supra, 683. McChesney remarks, "there is a question whether or not 'effective
possession' will extend into any of the airspace above that used or usable for
or in connection with a building. It should extend to space which for some
reason or other is of value to the owner of the surface

. .

.

We have

no doubt that there is or may be space above airspace of 'effective possession'
which is of value to the owner of the surface, and it should be regarded as a
trespass to interfere with that space by flying through it." MacChesney,
supra, 213-214. In the Smith case, supra, 393, the court speaks of Pollock's suggestion in reference to flying as low as 100 feet: "Even if this suggestion
of extreme limit be adopted as the test. . . . the plaintiffs seem entitled
to assert that there have been trespasses upon their lands.

. .

.

The test

suggested is not actual but possible effective possession. It is not decisive
that the plaintiff do not at the present make that possible effective possession
a realized occupation." In a comment on the Smith c ase, the decision that
flying "lower than the 500 foot statutory minimum amounts to a trespass" is
defended on principle as such flights are "well within the owner's actual or
possible effective possession and creates in the average mind a sense of infringement of a property right." Comment (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 579, 581.
Ballantine's Law Dictionary (1930 ed., 423) defines "effective possession" as "a
species of constructive possession" applied "when a man occupies a part of a
tract of land claimed by him, in the name of the whole tract." As used in the
sense of actual or virtual possession in a replevin suit, see, Lieverinan v. Clark
(1904) 114 Tenn. 117, 138; 85 S. W. 258, 264; Words and Phrases 1154 (2nd
series).
If the concept of effective possession is employed at all, it should be
used in the sense that will regulate the action of trespass so as to best
compromise the conflicting interests of land owners and aviation. As there
is no judicial precedent, the selection of an interpretation of effective possession is largely the result of policy. No single understanding of the scope
of effective possession is presented by the above writers, and their views are
not free from doubt. Rather than classify them, an enumeration will be attempted of the various assignable meanings to the scope of the phrase, and the
objections proffered to each. The various interpretations may be primarily divided into those that conceive of effective possession as a fixed standard depending on some means of measuring the potential occupancy of property, and
those that conceive of it as a variant standard depending on actual occupancy.
Measured by potential occupancy, effective possession may include the
superjacent space (1) occupied by the limit of possible permanent appurtenances, both natural and artificial, such as trees and buildings, but irrespective of present realization; (2) required in the sense that an intrusion
interferes with the reasonable use and enjoyment of the possible permanent
appurtenances; (3) used for the possible extent of aerial navigation by the
owner above his own land, as well as required for the enjoyment of the
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possible permanent appurtenances; or (4) valuable to the property owner
in the sense that an intrusion into that space effects the possible market value
of any possible use. All the above ways of measuring the potential occupancy
of property for the purpose of designating effective possession and ultimately
the scope of the present right to maintain trespass, not possible trespass, are
open to serious objection. While these interpretations have the advantage of
uniformity throughout the country at any one given time, they require flying
over every farm and unoccupied parcel of land to be at the same height as
over the tallest buildings. Such a situation is ridiculous and would be an
unwarranted burden on aviation.
Judging by the various ways of measuring actual occupancy, effective
possession may include the superjacent space (1) occupied with actual permanent appurtenances, such as above mentioned; (2) required in the sense that
all invasions interfere with the reasonable use and enjoyment of such realized
appurtenances; (3) used for actual aerial navigation by the owner above his
own land, as well as required for the enjoyment of the actual appurtenances;
or (4) valuable to the property owner in the sense that an intrusion into that
space affects the market value of the present use. The worth of these conceptions varies. The first interpretation in limiting effective possession to
the space actually enclosed by physical objects on the land unduly limits the
land owner's right to bring trespass beyond that which has been recognized
in permitting ejectment of telegraph wires: Butler v. Frontier Telephone
Co. (1906) 186 N. Y. 486; 79 N. E. 716. The land owner would be required to rely upon establishing a nuisance for all relief that he desired for
invasions not directly affecting occupied space. The second interpretation
substantially provides that all flights, which also create a nuisance, may he
held trespasses. This would be an advantage to the land owner in relieving
him of proving damages after presumptions had grown up governing the
extent of this region for each use of the land. It, however, does not settle
the problem of permanent occupancy which is so high that it does not interfere with the use and enjoyment being made of the land, as if the owner
of a skyscraper should place a flagpole on the top of his building so that it
would overhang an adjoining vacant lot: Bouvr, "Private Ownership of Airspace" 1 Air Law Rev. 376, 393. A distinction should be made between
permanent occupancy of unused airspace and temporary occupancy for purposses of flight: Zollmann, "Law of the Air" (1928) 1S. Nothing should be
permitted by way of easements to interfere with the owner taking possession
of the unused space above his property. Mere flying can probably never
develop into easements, because of the improbability of proving that the same
geometric space was repeatedly occupied: Comment (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev.
569. The third interpretation is undesirable in allowing the landowner to
acquire special flying privileges in the airspace above his property which are
denied the public becau se it would lead to great confusion in air traffic rules
and a perversion of the fundamental purpose of adjusting the interests of the
occupier of the land and the public in flying.
The fourth interpretation, under both the potential and actual ways of
conceiving of occupancy, advances the idea of value which is suggested as a
more tangible concept than "enjoyment and use," and may conceivably furnish
the standard for fixing effective possession. Value depends on the market
and use on the individual's subjective standard, and to this extent is more
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objective. However, an unnecessary refinement is made in distinguishing
between space necessary to the use, and space of value to the landowner,
since airspace is only valuable because of present or future use which can
be made of it, and there is no reason for the present market value of air
rights to decrease because flying is now permitted therein, if it is clearly
understood that as soon as that space is made use of in connection with the
occupation, flying therein must cease.
Inquiry into the precise meaning of such coined phrases as "effective
possession" shows the impossibility of making decisions by the mere use of
words which are novel and undefined. It also shows the relativity and difficulty in defining such fundamental concepts as "property," "ownership," "land,"
"possession" and "trespass." For most situations inquiry behind their presumed acceptance is unnecessary, but when new interests of importance arise,
offhand conceptions are frequently inconvenient tools for obtaining practical
results and their foundation in utility and consistency must be investigated.
In the situation presented by this case, the formula of trespass is just such
an example. The action of trespass quare clausum fregit lies for every
direct invasion of real property against an unlicensed stranger to the possession, and was conceived as a possessary action based on an interference
with possession. The formula was easily applied as long as the "property"
involved in litigation was readily acknowledged to be within possession, but
when litigation arose over the upper airspace the court had to go outside
the formula to decide what to put into their tool, namely, to decide if airspace was property and, if so, when possessed for purposes of bringing trespass. Much has been written of the nature and desirability of property:
"Rational Basis of Legal Institutions" (Legal Phil. Series, 1923) 167-413.
Kocourek enumerates seven theories of the nature of "property" which he
divides into those holding that "land" or real property includes only "material substance," and those that conceive of it as geometric space; the latter
of which he accepts as presenting "the fewest practical difficulties": Kocourek,
"Jural Relations" (1928) (2nd ed.) 336.
Ball has classified the views of the extent of ownership in superadjacent
space into four groups: Ball, supra, 640-643. The first view regarded
ownership as extending no farther upward than the surface of the earth
anl the structures thereon. The second view is designated the "zone theory"
and conceives of real property as extending into the superjacent space a limited and definite distance, measured by such descriptive terms as "effective
possession," "actual user," ''usual air column." The third view regarded
ownership as extending indefinitely upward, subject to a natural easement for
aerial navigation in the upper stratas. The last view literally accepted the
maxim cuius est solum and regarded all intrusions of superincumbent space
as invasions of ownership sufficient for trespass.
While the phrase is deservedly criticized for ambiguity and as adding
nothing to legal theory in itself, it should be appreciated that the authors who
have used the phrase have been grasping for a short verbal expression to
convey what others have been expressing in more verbose manner. The
authors above quoted, along with many others not using the phrase, arc
uniformly seeking to express the intangible idea that there should be some
compromise of the rights in the airspace. This is what Ball calls "the zone
theories." The fault with effective possession lies in the fact that it ex-
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presses no specific compromise, and cannot properly be employed as a label
until the identity of the concept to be labelled is placed beyond controversy.
Distinguishing "ownership of land" from what was said of "land as a
thing element," Kocourek calls the problem of the extent of ownership.
"cne of policy and not of logic!': supra, 337. Miraglia recognized the same
basis, "But property in the atmosphere and the subsoil is limited as any
other property by the needs of social coexistence and the activity and The
general interest of man. Private ownership should work for the good of
law and is justified by that idea." Miraglia, "Comparative Legal Philosophy'
(Legal Phil. Series, 1912) 476. Holmes tersely summarizes the policy behind
property rights by his majority opinion in Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter (1908) 209 U. S. 349, 355, 28 Sup. Ct. 529, 531, where the right of
New Jersey to forbid the diversion of water out of the state was upheld: "All
rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all
in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are
other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which be
comes strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached. The
limits set to property by other public interests present themselves as a branch
of what is called the police power of the State. The boundary at which the
conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in
advance, but points in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side."
The present court has had the double task of determining the content
of the trespass formula in regard to the new area of litigation, and also of
deciding if the equities in the situation presented fitted into the content of
the trespass formula as so found. The tenor of the decision suggests that
the court conceived effective possession as including the space that is so
connected with the present use of the land that an invasion interferes with
its safe and quiet enjoyment. This interpretation is probably least objectionable although it destroys most of the characteristics of trespass which
distinguish the conditions under which that action lies from those under which
nuisance lies. This interpretation of "effectivq possession has the merit of
preserving the trespass formula, without apparently breaking with precedent,
in a garb consistent with modern progress. But the court probably avoided
committing itself to this policy refinement of trespass when it found the
nuisance formula available and steeped in precedent.
Whether the court legitimately avoided committing itself on the nature
of the land owner's property interest in the upper airspace, and whether the
decision was supported by adequate reasons, depends largely on the individual's
view of the purpose of a judicial decision. The job of the judge may be
thought to consist, first, in reaching the decision he himself believes best,
under the circumstances presented, by weighing the various modern needs
and the experiences of the past as found in precedent; and, secondly, to add
an opinion supporting his decision with a legal justification which will be
least embarrassing to future courts and yet be consistent, if possible, with
the reasoning employed by previous courts. If such is believed to be the
job of the judge, then the present opinion was excellent, and the gap in
the law was admirably filled by a flexible standard. Placing thq injunction
against flying below 500 feet on the maintenance of a nuisance, and possibly
also on an interference with effective possession, left future judges un-
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hampered by standards in deciding their problems, because nuisance preeminently depends on the facts of the particular case and trespass likewise is
made to do so by employing the undefined concept of effective possession.
On the other hand, this advanced view of the judicial process is not widely
accepted, and, when a judge is presented with a gap in the law, such as the
present, it is generally hoped that he will lay down some general principle
which will be a standard for future courts and a guide by which lawyers
can predict future action. By introducing the concept of effective possession
and by basing its decision on the maintenance of a nuisance, the present
court has offered no such standard.
EDWARD C. SWEENEY.
AIRPORT-EMINENT DOMAIN-TAKING OUTSIDE CITY LIMITS [Wash.].Action brought by the City of Spokane to acquire by eminent domain proceedings certain lands for the extension of its airport. The land in question
adjoins the existing municipal airport and is situated outside the city limits.
Defendants appeal from an order of appropriation on the ground that the
city has no power to go beyond its territorial limits to condemn property
for airport purposes. The Washington airport statute of 1925 provides:
"That all cities . . . are authorized and empowered . . . to acquire
sites
.
for landings, terminals, housing, repair and4 care of
airplanes .
and to acquire by . . . condemnation . . . all lands
..
necessary therefor . . .; and the same is hereby declared to be a
city . . . purpose and a public use. Cities . . . are hereby empowered
to acquire lands . . . for said purpose by the exercise of the power of
eminent domain . . ." Defendants contended that since the above statute
does not specifically provide for the taking of property outside the city,
therefore the power to do so for that purpose has been withheld. Held:
Although the airport statute does not give such power, yet this statute taken
together with existing general condemnation statutes applicable to cities, does
authorize the city to condemn property either within or without the city
limits. (The general condemnation statutes of Washington provided that
"such city shall have power to purchase or appropriate private property
within or without its corporate limits, for its corporate uses," and provided
for such appropriation by eminent domain proceedings.) The general condemnation statutes gavq the city power to take land outside its limits for its
corporate uses. The airport statute specifically authorized the taking of
land for use as airports, and declared that to be a city and a public use.
The two statutes must be read together, and so read, authorize the taking
of land outside the corporate limits for use as an airport. City of Spokane
v. Williams et at (Washington, May, 1930) 288 P. 258, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 71.
The same construction of these statutes was made in State ex rel. City of
Walla Walla v. Clausen (Wash., June, 1930) in their application to cities of
the second class. 289 P. 61, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 79.
Although the federal government has taken upon itself the regulation of
aviation in general, its policy in regard to the establishment and maintenance
of airports has been to leave that to the individual states. The policy of
most of the states has been to pass that responsibility on to the municipalities. Most airports are, and from their nature at the present time, must be
outside the territorial limits of the cities they serve. Since the powers of
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municipalities are ordinarily restricted to exercise within their boundaries,
the problem of the power of the city to establish such airports presented
itself at once. Zollmann, "Airports" (1929) 13 Marq. L. Rev. 97.
The solution has in large part been in the enactment of statutes expressly
granting to political subdivisions of the states the power to establish airports.
At the present time there are about thirty-six states having general airport
enabling statutes. Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Massacbusetts, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia had no such general statutes up to January, 1930: Freeman, "Survey
of State Aeronautical Legislation, 1928-1929" (1930) 1 Air Law Rev. 61;
1929 U. S. Av. R. 386 ff. Several of these states, however, Georgia and South
Carolina in particular, have passed special acts giving such power to certain
named cities. Generally, the statutes confer the power upon cities, towns,
and villages; in some states only to certain classes of cities; in some to
counties also; in Illinois to park districts; in California to specially authorized airport districts; in New Mexico to school districts also; in Idaho to
highway districts also; and in Washington, also to port districts.
In some twenty-three of the states the power given the municipalities to
establish airports expressly authorizes the acquisition of land "within or
without" the limits of the municipality. In those states the power of the
city to acquire and hold, land outside the city limits is no serious problem,
although even in those states the question may arise as to how far outside
the city limits the city may go. In some states, as in Texas and South Dakota,
this extra-territorial power is given to municipalities, but not to counties. In
other states, as in Washington and Wyoming, nothing is said in the statute
as to what land may be acquired. Some states limit the cities to land without
their boundaries or within a specified number of miles outside the boundaries.
The methods prescribed for the acquisition of property to be used as airports are in most of these states quite broad, as "purchase, gift, lease, condemnation, and otherwise." Some do not expressly provide for acquisition
by condemnation.
From the foregoing summary of the various statutes on the subject, it is
apparent that in most of the states the establishment of airports by municipalities furnishes one or more serious problems from the point of the power
so to do.
"A municipal corporation being a governmental institution, designed to
create a local government over a limited territory, the general rule is that
such a corporation cannot purchase and hold real estate beyond its territorial limits, unless the power to do so is expressly given by the legislature":
Langley v. Augusta (1903) 118 Ga. 590, 45 S. E. 486;! Dillon, Mun. Corp.
(5th ed. 1911) sec. 980. The power to condemn such land by the exercise
of the right of eminent domain, requires even more express and clear a
grant than does the power to acquire such property by ordinary methods:
Leeds v. City of Richmond, 102 Ind. 372 (1885) p. 377, 1 N. E. 711. The
power to acquire such land is not conferred by a power "to purchase, hold,
and convey any estate, real or personal, for the public use of said corporation," and a conveyance of such land to a city having that power is void:
Riley v. Rochester (1853) 9 N. Y. 64.
The state may grant to a municipality the power to acquire lands beyond
the municipal limits and for that purpose to exercise the power of eminent
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domain: Dillon, supra, sec. 1028. The question in most cases is: Has the
legislature granted such power?
Although the rules stated above are considered to be quite generally
recognized, there are cases that do hold that a municipal corporation, where
not expressly prohibited, may purchase and hold real estate outside its corporate limits for legitimate municipal purposes: Schneider v. Menasha
(1903) 118 Wis. 298, 95 N. W. 94; Smith v. City of Kuttawa (1928) 222 Ky.
569, 1 S. W. (2d) 979; Lester v. Jackson (1892) 11 So. 114, 69 Miss. 887;
Hubbard, McClintock & Williams, "Airports" (1930) (Harvard City Planning Studies I) p. 119. A recent text writer, McQuillan, "Mun. Corp." (2nd
ed. 1928) sec. 1210, considers that the line of cases so holding apply the rule
"supported by the weight of authority as well as by the better reasoning,"
especially where the city has a broad charter provision, such as one conferring power to purchase and hold real estate sufficient "for the public use,
convenience, or necessities." Of course, even under these cases, although
the city may, unless expressly prohibited, purchase and hold real estate beyond
its limits, in the absence of a statutory authorization, the city may not
exercise any governmental authority-any police power--over such land, but
may exercise only those rights and powers springing from ownership.
Further, these cases generally apply only to acquisition by means other than
condemnation: Lewis, "Eminent Domain," sec. 372.
When has the statute conferred the power to acquire land outside the
city limits? In Spokane v. Williams, supra, the court combined the airport
statute with the general condemnation statute and found such authorization.
In City of Wichita v. Clapp (1928) 125 Kan. 100, the airport statute authorized thd acquisition of land for an airport. Another statute gave the city
power to condemn land for public parks outside the city limits, not to exceed
five miles therefrom. The city sought to condemn land outside its limits,
but five miles therefrom, as a park. Seventy pqr cent of the land was to be
used as an aviation field. The court held that though the airport statute-.
since it did not expressly authorize acquisition of land outside the limitswas not sufficient to authorize the acquisition, yet the park statute was sufficient, holding that the use of land for an airport comes within the proper
and legitimate purposes for which public park statutes may be created. Thus
the public park statutes may furnish the necessary authorization: Note,
63 A. L. R. 484; Hubbard, McClintock & Williams, "Airports," supra, 120;
Schmoldt v. City of Oklahoma (Okla., 1930) 1930 U. S. Av. R. 195. A
statute authorizing a city to acquire land for park purposes near the city
will authorize tha taking of land five miles from the city limits: City of
Nashviile v. Vaughn (1929) 158 Tenn. 498, 145 S. W. (2d) 716. A charter
giving a city power to establish parks adjacent to the city empowers the city
to take land one and a half miles outside the city limits separated from the
city by intervening tracts of land: Booth v. City of Minneapolis (1925)
163 Minn. 223, 203 N. W. 625.
Municipalities have power to do those things which are necessarily o
fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted, and thus if
it is necessary to acquire land outside the city limits in order effectively to
exercise a power expressly granted, the power to acquire such land will be
implied: Mulville v. City of San Diego (1920) 183 Cal. 734, 192 P. 702;
Leeds v. City of Richmond (1885) 102 Ind. 372, 377; Dillon, supra, sec. 1028;
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McQuillan, supra, sec. 1580. Thus, where a municipality is given the power
to construct sewers within its borders, the power to acquire land outside its
borders as an outlet for the sewers follows necessarily by implication:
Pioneer Real Estate Co. v. City of Portland (Oregon, 1926)! 247P319;
Village of Broadview v. Dianish (1929) 335 I11.
299; Langley v. Augusta
(1903) 118 Ga. 590. Some courts hold this power il not limited to cases
where it is absolutely necessary to acquire land outside the limits, but is
also implied in cases where it is extremely desirable from the point of view
of health and sanitation: City of Champaign v. Harmon (1881) 98 Ill. 491,
494; Coldwater v. Tucker (1877) 36 Mich. 474, 478; Cochran v. Park Ridge
(1891) 138 Ill.
295, 300; Dillon, supra, sec. 980. The power is implied in
the sewer, cemetery, and pest house cases because the health and protection
of the inhabitants require that these be located outside the city. It might
be urged that similar considerations of safety would call for the location of
airports outside the city, and that a statute authorizing the city to establish
airports impliedly authorizes the acquisition of land for that purpose outside the city. It is quite apparent, however, that the safety of the inhabitants
much more strongly demands sewers located outside the city than it does airports outside the city. In Hafner v. City of St. Louis (1900) 161 Mo. 34,
61 S. W. 632, the charter in one section granted, power to "hold, purchase,
and convey such real and personal estate as the purposes of the corporation
shall require"; and in another section, power to purchase and hold real property beyond its limits for certain enumerated purposes, not including wharves.
The court held that the city had power to purchase land outside the limits
for use as a wharf, that being a corporate use, and wharves in their nature
often requiring land outside the city limits. The designation of certain purposes for which the city might acquire land outside the city was held not to
limit the city to those purposes. A quite close analogy might be drawn letween wharves and airports. In the Hafner case the acquisition was by purchase. In City of Detroit v. Oakland Circuit Judge (1927) 237 Mich. 446,
212 N. W. 207, the state constitution provided that "any city or village may
acquire, own, establish and maintain, either within or without its corporate
limits, parks . . . and all works which involve the public health or safety."
The city ha4 acquired by gift land used as a park located two miles outside
the city, and to procure a better entrance to the park, undertook to condemn
pi ivate land, relying in part upon that constitutional provision. The co.rt
held that provision not sufficient authorization, on the ground it was not selfexecuting, that it required enabling acts of the legisalture to make it effectivc.
In State v. District Court (1923) 67 Mont. 164 a statute gave the city power
to own land outside the city for use as a park. The city sought to acquire
by eminent domain land outside its limits for a highway leading to the park;
the court refused to imply that power. Thus the courts will imply power
to purchase where they will not imply power to condemn. "If the act is
silent on the subject and the power given by it can be exercised without
resort to condemnation, it is presumed that the legislature intended that the
necessary property should be acquired by contract: Lewis, "Eminent Domain"
(3rd ed. 1909) sec. 371. There are cases, however, in which the power is
implied, as irn Helm v. Grayville (1906) 224 Ill.
274, holding that where a
statute gave the city power to acquire ferries by "purchase, lease, or gift"
it does not exclude the acquiring of a ferry site by condemnation, and such
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power is implied as being within the intention of the legislature. On this
point, the general rule is that in the absence of a restriction in the charter,
property may be acquired by a municipality by any ordinary method (exclud-

ing condemnation), but if the charter prescribes a particular mode of acquiring property, that mode must be followed:

McQuillan, supra, sec. 1220.

A

municipal corporation may acquire property by purchase, dedication, gift,
demise or bequest, prescription, the act of incorporation, grant from the
state, lease, redemption from a sheriff's sale, and by statute, condemnation.
Although it is generally acknowledged that when the power to condemn for
certain purposes is expressly granted to a municipal corporation, land outside its limits cannot be condemned without special authority, Nichols, "Eminent Domain" (1917) sec. 359; and that statutes delegating the power of

eminent domain to a municipality, being incorporation of the state's sovereignty, must be strictly construed, In Re Water Front Improvement (1922)
194 N. Y. S. 857; yet if a city is authorized to engage in a public improvement beyond its limits and to acquire land therefor, a general power of
eminent domain conferred upon it to acquire land for its corporate purposes
may be exercised to effectuate the improvements beyond the city limits:
Dillon, supra, sec. 1028; McQuillan, supra, sec. 1619.
In Spokane v. Williams, and State v. Clausen, supra, the court combined a general statute authorizing condemnation of land outside the city
limits for corporate purposes with an airport statute authorizing the establishment of airports and declaring them to be a corporate use. This combination is not quite so persuasive as that of such a general condemnation
statute with a statute authorizing improvements outside the limits, but that
this construction of such two statutes will be followed in those states having
the same combination is quite probable, in view of the cases holding that
the acquisition of land within or without the municipal limits, for use as an
airport is a municipal or public purpose; People v. Kelly (1879) 76 N. Y.
475 (not an airport case) ; Hesse v. Rath (1928) 224 N. Y. App. Div. 344;
State v. Johnson (Neb. 1928) 220 N. W. 273; Dysart v. St. Louis (Mo. 1928)
11 S. W. (2d) 1045; McClintock v. Roseburg (Oregon 1929) 273 P. 331;
State v. Cleveland (Ohio, 1927) 160 N. E. 241; State v. Jackson (Ohio, 1929)
167 N. E. 396; Concordia-Arrow Flying Service Corp. v. City of Concordia
(Kans., 1930) 289 P. 955; Note, 62 A. L. R. 777. In those states in which
the airport statutes authorize the acquisition of land outisde the limits the
municipalities may clearly acquire the land by ordinary methods. Whether
they may condemn it, not being specially authorized so to do, is doubtful,
for the necessity upon which the implication of such power is based, seems
lacking. In states in which neither the airport statute nor the general statutes
conferring powers upon municipalities authorize acquisition of land outside
the limits, it will be very difficult to imply such power for airports. In some
states the public park statutes may furnish the solution. In some, only
legislation will enable the cities to establish airports outside the city. Such
legislation in the very near future is very likely. Meanwhile, it is not at all
improbable that we may have some legislating by our courts, for as a recent
writer, Zollmann, 13 Marq. L. R. 97, 100, after reviewing the recent airport
cases observes: "The fact that in all these cases the power of the city to
do what it proposed to do was sustained is significant. The necessity of an
airport, if a city is not hopelessly to fall in the rear of the progress of the
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world, is so patent that courts apparently will deny it such powers only if
the legal limitations are such that the courts are unable to find an avenue of
escape from them. Courts in such matters, however, are ingenious and can
be relied upon to find the avenue ii there is one and perhaps in cases where
there is no avenue they may discover a back alley or a subterranean channel
or may boldly and in some measure appropriately escape from their predicament by some air route."
ABRAHAM FISH MAN

DIGESTS
Radio Digest
GENERAL ORDERS OF THE FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION

Until its adoption of General Order No. 93, on June 25, 1930, the Federal Radio Commission had not issued any formal handbook of rules and
regulations. Instead, it had from time to time issued what it called "general
orders" on a variety of subjects, some of which came within the description

of rules and regulations and others had to do with various other matters.
These general orders are available in mimeographed form at the office of
the Commission. They are also published from month to month in the
Department of Commerce Radio Service Bulletin. They are also contained
in the four annual reports of the Commission as follows:
Numbers 1-15, First Annual Report, Pages 1-16.
Numbers 16-49, Second Annual Report, Pages 41-55.
Numbers 50-74, Third Annual Report, Pages 55-67.
Numbers 70-94, Fourth Annual Report, Pages 8-37.1

By its General Order No. 93 the Commission adopted rules and regulations pertaining to practice and procedure before it; these rules and regulations were printed and are available in the form of a handbook. By the
same order, "all general orders or parts thereof and all rules and regulations in conflict therewith" were repealed. Rules and regulations covering
subjects other than practice and procedure are, however, to be found only in
the various general orders. Likewise any amendments to the rules and
regulations governing practice and procedur will undoubtedly appear first in
the form of general orders. Consequently there is need for a periodical
service summarizing these general orders from time to time and the JOURNAL
Some of the
OF AIR LAW will henceforth endeavor to meet this need.
general orders are very long and it is impractical to reprint them in full.
Sufficient only will be stated to indicate their subject matter and anyone
interested may obtain copies of them by addressing the Secretary of the
Federal Radio Commission.
The general orders adopted after the close of the period covered by the
Fourth Annual Report (to June 30, 1930) are as follows:
General Order No. 95-(Adopted September 29, 1930)
This order repeals General Order No. 9. It provides that insolvency of
the licensee shall bo ground for revocation of license or refusal of renewal
of license. It specifies requirements that must be met by applications for
1. Unfortunately this report omits extremely important amendments
which the Commission has adopted to General Orders 42 and 87.

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
the Commission's consent to the assignment of construction permits or
licenses, both in cases where the assignment is voluntary and where it is involuntary.
General Order No. 96-(Adopted October 6, 1930)
This order covers the issuance of licenses for auxiliary transmitters in
addition to the regular transmitters of broadcasting stations; requirements
with respect to the location, equipment, maintenance and operation of auxiliary transmitters; application of the order to auxiliary transmitters already
licensed and requirement that such transmitters comply with the requirements by the end of the license period, ending January 31, 1931; duplicate
transmitters for alternate operation together with the filing of reports
thereon; and notification to the Radio Supervisor after each use of an auxiliary transmitter.
General Order No. 97-(Adopted October 6, 1930)
This order covers the regulation and calculation of power used by
broadcasting stations. It provides that after January 31, 1931, no broadcasting station will be licensed with a greater power than can be satisfactorily delivered and maintained with a percentage of 75 per cent on peaks
with not over 10 per cent combined audio harmonics; that no broadcasting
station will be licensed to operate after January 31, 1931 with greater power
than the maximum rated carrier power of the transmitters as determined by
existing general orders of the Commission (See General Order No. 91,
adopted May 23, 1930) ; that stations claiming a greater carrier power than
such maximum rated power shall submit data showing antenna input power
by direct measurements and oscillograms of satisfactory modulation to prove
licensed power input and proper modulation. The order specifies the nature
of the oscillograms required and other data and requires the submission of
such data to the Commission and approval by the Commission on or before
January 31, 1931. The order forbids the making of any changes in the
transmitter affecting the maximum rated carrier power therof until such
changes have been authorized by the Commission.
General Order No. 98-(Adopted October 27, 1930)
This order amends General Order No. 28, adopted April 20, 1928. It
covers change in location of studios, the importance of the location being
largely because of the provisions of the Davis Amendment. The order dispenses with the necessity for the permission to move the main studio of the
station from one location to another within a city or town although it requires that the licensee first notify the Commission of any such change. For
authority and regular permission to make any other change in location,
written application and authority from the Commission are required. The
main studio is defined as "The studio from which the majority of the local
programs originate and from which a majority of station announcements are
made of programs originating at remote points." It does not apply to purely
secondary or auxiliary studios or remote control apparatus.

General Order No. 99-(Adopted October 27, 1930)
This order repeals General Order No. 94, adopted June 26, 1930. It
covers the licensing of aeronautical stations and cooperation among such
stations in the interest of economy in the use of frequencies, etc. It de-
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fines two types of aircraft, transport and itinerant; defines an aeronautical
station; classifies frequencies for aviation purposes into three classes; specifies distress, calling and navigational frequencies and frequencies other than
those permanently assigned to chains; makes available on a temporary basis
two frequencies designated by the President for governmental and experimental stations; limits the use of frequencies by aeronautical stations and
point-to-point service to certain specified uses and subject to certain requirements; forbids the use of such frequencies by such stations for commercial
correspondence or for paid or toll messages in the sense in which these terms
are generally understood and accepted; establishes certain "chains" as indicated upon a map to be maintained by the Commission showing the location
of all aeronautical stations, the frequencies allocated by the Commission, and
as nearly as possible all proposed chains (copies of the map being available
upon request), defines the word "day" when used in connection with a specific frequency as "that period of time included between two hours after
local sunrise and two hours before local sunset," with the qualification for
cases when it is impossible to shift from day to a night frequency at the
exact time required; forbids the use of more than 1 kw by aeronautical
stations on frequencies of 1,500 kc and above; requires that aeronautical
stations maintain a watch on such frequencies and for such periods of time
as may be designated; makes general requirements with respect to the construction and efficiency of equipment; requires the posting of licenses in a
conspicuous place in the station and that licenses of station operators be
available for inspection at all times while on duty. Violation of the order
will be cause for revocation of the license under the Radio Act of 1927.
General Order No. 100--(Adopted November 10, 1930)
This order defines "marine relay service" as "a radio telegraph communication service carried on between coastal stations communicating with one
another for the relaying of, or pertaining to, maritime mobile communications." It provides that upon application and proper showing the Commission may issue a license or other instruments of authorization for marine
relay service to (a) any coastal station for the t'ansmission of radio operating signals utilizing the calling or individual working frequencies licensed
to such coastal station for mobile service (radio operating signals being defined in the order) : (b) to any Great Lakes coastal station for the relaying of
messages e;ther destined to or originating at mobile stations of the Great
Lakes with the restriction of such use to frequencies licensed to such coastal
station which are available for both fixed and mobile service under the prov:sions of the International Radio Convention; (c) to any other coastal
station for the relaying via another coastal station of messages destined to a
mobile station with the restriction of such use to the working frequencies
licensed to such coastal station for mobile service and to the normal routing of traffic but only when for any reason the initial coastal station has
been unable to communicate directly with such mobile station. The order
further provides that licenses for marine relay service will authorize commun;cation only between coastal stations located in the same geographical
area. These areas are designated as follows:
(a) Atlantic-Gulf area; (b) Great Lakes area; (c)

Pacific area.
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General Order No. 101-(Adopted November 14, 1930)
This order extends all existing licenses except those for stations in
Alaska, as follows:
Point-to-point, Coastal, Marine Relay, Ships above 1,500 kc.
Aeronautical and aeronautical point-to-point, and Aircraft, to April 1,
1931.
Policei Fire, Experimental Visual Broadcasting, Experimental Relay
Broadcasting, to May 1, 1931.
With reference to Alaska stations other than broadcasting which expire
between November 14, 1930 and June 1, 1931, the order extends them until
June 1, 1931, subject to the condition that' the order is not to be construed
as aj finding by the Commission that the continued use and operation of any
such station serves public interest, etc., and reserving the right to the Commission to change the frequency assignment of any such station during the
extension, if in the opinion of the Commission such change is advisable.
General Order No. 89 requiring a filing of applications for renewal
thirty days prior to the expiration date of the license is to be construed to
apply to the extension dates.
The licenses for the following services are not affected by the terms of
the order and the expiration dates are as specified in the licenses: Geophysical, General Experimental, Special Experimental, Temporary services,
Ships below 1,500 kc and Amateur.
Amendment to General Order No. 88-(Adopted November 14, 1930)
This amended General Order repeals General Order No. 62; defines a
channel in the band of frequencies exceeding 1,500 kc. according to its position in the spectrum and specifies the width in each band; defines the width
of visual broadcasting, commercial telephone, and relay broadcasting channels; provides that in granting licenses the Commission will specify the
frequency in the center of the channel but that the licensee may occupy
adjacent frequencies within the limits indicated by the order; and provides
for granting to the licensees of fixed stations, upon application and proper
showing, authority to communicate with other: points than the points specified in their licenses.
Amendment to General Order No. 74-(Adopted Nov. 25, 1930)
This amendment provides for a temporary or emergency radio service
in connection with motion picture production, to be called "Temporary Service
for Motion Pictures." It makes the frequencies 1,552 kc. and 1,556 kc.
available for such use; the frequency 1,554 kc. is made available for assignment to this service where telephone communication is used. The use is to
be confined to such times as the frequency is actually needed to supply communication between points where other communication facilities can not be
used. Applications must specify the exact geographical points between which
communication is desired together with a statement as to availability of
other forms of communication. licenses are to be limited to 90 days and
power to 250 watts. The frequencies are to be available for the use of
all responsible applicants who need frequencies for this class of service.
RADIO COMMUNICATION

AS

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-FEDERAL

EMPLOYERS'

Van Dusen v.
Department of Labor & Industries (Wash., Sept. 8, 1930) 290 Pac. 803, the
LIABILITY

ACT-EMPLOYEE

OF BROADCASTING

STATION.-In
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Supreme Court of Washington held that an employee of a broadcasting station, who was electrocuted while moving the switchboard of the station in
order to make possible the installation of an ice machine for the purpose of
producing cold water to cool the radio tubes, was engaged in work so closely
related to interstate commerce that it constituted an employment in such commerce within the meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The radio
station was KGA at Spokane, Wash., owned and operated by the Northwest
Radio Service Company, with 5 kw power under license from the Federal
Radio Commission. The telephone exchange was an integral part of the
broadcasting system, being used in connection therewith, and the station
being connected by telephone lines with cities and other states for the purpose
of receiviig and rebroadcasting programs.
SALE OF RADIO SETS-CLAIM OF DEFECTIVE CONSTRUCTION BECAUSE OF
UNSUITABILITY TO CLIMATE.-In Kodel Radio Corporation v. Schuler (La.,

Nov. 3, 1930) So. -,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the
ruling of the trial court disallowing the reconvention demand for damages
of a defendant retail dealer against a plaintiff manufacturer of radio receiving sets who had sued the defendant for the price of the sets. The defendant
returned the sets to thei plaintiff claiming that they were defective in construction and not suited to the climate. The court held that since the
plaintiff believed in good faith that the sets were so constructed that they
would function in the climate, he was responsible only for the return of the
price and payment of expenses, and was not responsible for damages. On the
other hand, however, the court held the defendant not liable for any part of
the price of the sets which he returned, and upheld the defendant's counterclaim for freight and drayage on the returned sets as well as the cost of
advertising them for sale.
RADIO ACT op 1927-VIOLATIoN

OF SECTION' 29 (USE OF PROFANE, INDE-

CENT AND ABUslvE LANGUAGE) BY A BROADCASTING STATION-In United
States v. Robert Gordon Duncan (D. C., D. Ore., Nov. 10, 1930), the District
judge overruled defendant's motion for a new trial and in arrest of judgment,
and rendered an oral opinion rejecting defendant's claim that the provisions
of the Radio Act of 1927 under which he was prosecuted and convicted were
invalid as an unconstitutional intervention of the police power of the state
and the count on which he was indicted did not state a crime. Defendant had
been convicted of the use of profane, indecent and abusive language in violation of Section 29 of the Radio Act. This case is the sequel to proceedings
which were had before the Federal Radio Commission earlier in the year.
The defendant Duncan had used the language complained of over station
KVEP at Portland, Oregon, owned and operated by William B. Schaeffer
(doing business as Schaeffer Radio Company)' which was then licensed by
the Federal Radio Commission to operate on the frequency of 1490 kc. with
power of 15 watts. The station's application for renewal of license was set
for hearing because of its permitting Duncan regularly to use such language,
and after hearing, the application for renewal was denied with the result
that the station was eliminated. The owner of the station, Schaeffer, thereupon took an appeal to the Court of Appeals of thd District of Columbia
under Section 16 of the Radio Act and the Commission filed a statement of
grounds for its decisions, upholding its right to eliminate the station. The
appeal raised the interesting and important question as to whether the language used, which consisted of violent abuse by Duncan of political adversaries, constituted indecent and abusive language within the meaning of Section 29 and whether the Commission could thus indirectly censor station programs. Unfortunately, however, the appellant allowed the appeal to be
dismissed for failure to take the steps necessary to cause the record to be
printed.
Louis G. 'CALDWELL.
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AIRPLANE

A

"VEHICLE"-INCLUSION

OF' AIRPLANES

WITHIN

SCOPE OF

MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT ACT [Federal]-The defendant induced one Lacey,

an aviator in his employ, to steal an airplane from the United States Aircraft Corporation at Ottawa, Illinois, and the plane thus stolen was flown
to Guymon, Oklahoma, where it was seized by the authorities. The defendant
was convicted in the District Court of the United States for an alleged
violation of the National Motor, Vehicle Act (41 Stat. 324, 1919, 18 U. S.
C. A. (1926) sec. 408], which defines.motor vehicles to include an "automobile, automobile- truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self
propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails." Held, on appeal, that
the phrase, "any other self propelled vehicle," includes an airplane, it being
a means of transportation that is self propelled and of the same general
class as an automobile or a motorcycle. Judgment affirmed: McBoyle v.
United States (C. C. A. 10th, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 273.
One judge dissented on the ground that as a penal statute should be
construed strictly against the offender, and must state clearly the persons
and things denounced, the omission specifically to mention airplanes, and
the rule of ejusdem generis, excluded airplanes from the act.
There are no other cases directly in point. One state, Indiana, specifically enumerates airplanes and airships in their vehicle theft act. Acts
of 1917 p. 174, Acts of 1.921 p. 494, Acts of 1927 p. 577, 1929 U. S. Av. R.
547, 550.
PAUL C. AKIN

GASOLINs TAX-INTERSTATEI

AND

INTRA-STATE

COM MERCE-[Federal]-

The plaintiffs are engaged in the transportation by airplane of passengers,
freight, express, and mail from points outside to points within the State
and vice y~ersa. The motor power of the airplanes is furnished by gasoline
which they buy in this State (Oklahoma) subject by statute, (Laws Okla.
1923 c. 239, as amended by Laws 1923 24 c. 101, Laws 1925, c. 198, and
Laws 1929 [Sp. Sess.] cc 278, 279.) to a State excise tax of 4c per gallon
on all gasoline consumed in the state, levied for the construction and
maintenance of4 highways and bridges. The inter-state and intira-state
business of the company are so commingled and related that the tax cannot
be apportioned between them. The plaintiff denies all liability for the tax
on gasoline used in their transportation business. United States Airways, Inc.
et al v. Shaw State Auditor (1930) 43 Fed. (2nd) 148.
The court held that the plaintiffs are concededly engaged in interstate
commerce and therefore if the legislature intended by the statute to tax
gasoline used in interstate transportation then whether the consumption
occurs within or without the state the tax operates directly as a burderi on
interstate commerce which is invalid because the states have no power to
control or regulate such commerce. Constitution art. 1. 8, cl. 3. Helson &
Randolph v. Kentucky (1929) 279 U. S. 245. But as to the tax on the
intra-state business, the fact that the two types of business of the company
are so commingled that the tax cannot be apportioned between them, is
sufficient, because the proportunate part cannot be identified, to make the
whole tax unenforceable. Bowman v. Continental Oil Co. (1921) 256 U. S.
642.
The plaintiffs are entitled to a perpetual injunction against the collection
by the state of the tax upon the gasoline they may hereafter buy in the
state.
W. K. TEu.
AIRPORT

CONSTRUED

AS

PARK

IMPROVEMENT-BOND

ISSUE--VALIDITY-

[Okla.]-The plaintiff, a property owner, applied for an injunction and for

the cancellation of bonds voted by the property owners of Oklahoma City;
the funds from the sale of such bonds were to be used in establishing
and equipping an airport as part of a park improvement under Section 27
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Article 10 of the Constitution which provided for municipal ownership of
public utilities, specifically a public park. Plaintiff's application was denied.
The court held on appeal: that the establishment of an aviation airport
with all the necessary equipment, buildings, and appurtenances was a park
improvement under the constitutional provisions: Schmoldt v. City of Oklahoma (1930) 291 p. 119.
For further references, see: 14 St. Louis Law Rev. 441; Mich. Law
Rev. 940; 12 Minn. Law Rev. 549; 8 Tenn. Law Rev. 64 (1929); Marg.
Law Rev. 97.
ISABELLE M.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONs-AUTHORITY

TO

LEASE

PuBLIC

ISDEBSKI
LANDS

FMR

AIRPoRT-The city of Jersey City !eased to the Jersey City Airport Inc.
certaitt made land filled in by the city in connection with other lands
acquired with riparian rights and which had been used for airport purposes
prior to the lease. The New Jersey Statute (Act of April 1, 1929,
P. L. p. 49) authorized the governing body of any municipality to use for
airport purposes land previously acquired for other public purposes and now
being used for a n airport, and the power to lease such land. Suit was
brought by a taX payer to test the validity of the lease and it was held valid
in the lower court. On certiorari the judgment was affirmed, the court
stating that the city was authorized to make such a transaction even though
an ordinance rather than a resolution might have been the better procedure.
A public sale was held to be unnecessary, the language of the enabling
statute authorizing the airport lease "for a consideration and for such term
of years as may be agreed upon": Stern v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey
City (N. J. 1930) 150 Atl. 9.
A majority of the states have statutes authorizing municipal acquisition
of land for airports by lease, condemnation, or purchase; and have further
provisions for the operation and maintenance of airports. However, except
for New Jersey (Act of April 1, 1929, P. L. p. 49) and Pennsylvania (Laws
of 1923, No. 192, $460b-3), the statutes are silent as to the power of the
city to lease such land to a private individual or corporation.
W. K. TELL
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-AUTHORITY

TO

ACQUIRE

LAND

OUTSIDE
plaintiff
was a municipal corporation of the second class, operating under a commission form of government. At a special election pursuant to an ordinance
of the city commission, the electors of said city granted thei plaintiff
authority to borrow $50,000 and to issue negotiable bonds in that amount
for the purpose of establishing a municipal airport within or without the
corporate limits. Bids for the bonds were accepted from the board of
finance of the Stato of Washington. Upon the refusal of the state auditor
to accept the bonds issued by the plaintiff or to deliver to the plaintiff a
warrant in payment therefor, this original application to the Supreme Court
of Washington for a peremptory writ of mandamus was made by the
plaintiff to compel said officer to perform both acts. The defense was
based on the theory that the authority to expend money outside its corporate
limits for airport development was neither expressly granted to, nor
impliedly or incidentally included in the express powers of, the plaintiff.
Authority to acquire, maintain and operate air ports and to condemn lands
for this purpose was granted to the plaintiff, and such acts were declared to
be a municipal purpose and public use by Washington laws, 1929, sec.
1, p. 180. Although this statute is silent concerning the acquirement of
airports outside the corporate limits, an earlier statute conferred upon the
plaintiff as a municipal corporation the right to acquire property within or
without the corporate limits for any corporate purpose: Wash. Comp. Stat.
(Rem. 1907) sec. 69, p.
Held: That the writ be granted on the ground
that the two statutes are to be considered together, and that thus combined
they confer on a municipal corporation the power to acquire, for airport
CORPORATE

LIMITS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF

AIRPORT-

(Wash.) -The
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purposes land outside the corporate limits. State ex rel. City of Walla Walla
v. Clausen (Wash. 1930) 289 Pac. 61.
GEORGE KEVIN RAY
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-AUTHORITY TO SUBLEASE MUNICIPAL AIRPORT
plaintiff, a private airplane corporation, brought an action to require the mayor of Concordia to
execute a lease to the plaintiff relating to the establishment of an airport
following a resolution and ordinance passed by the city in pursuance of the
following statute: (Laws, 1929, Chap. 5)
"An act providing for the acquisition, improvement, equipment, maintenance and regulation of municipal airports and airfields for aviation purposes by cities of all classes and providing for issuance of bonds and levying

TO PRIVATE AIRPLANE CORPORATION- (Kan.) -The

of taxes therefor". Section 4 of this act provided that the governing body
or park board could lease or sublease such airport for aviation purposes
to corporations for the proper operation of such property.
The defendant claimed that the title of the act, supra, was not broad
enough to allow subletting as provided for by section 4, and was therefore
unconstitutional (Art. 2 Sec. 16); and that the purpose of the undertaking
was for a private rather that%a public use.
The court held, that the title of the act did not have to specify subletting
in order to be valid, and was therefore constitutional; that the establishment
of the airport was a public and not a private use: Concordia Arrow Flying
Service Corporatio~n v. City of Concordia (1930) 131 Kan. 247, 289 p. 955.
ISABELLE M. ISDEBSKI

